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 We are delighted and daunted by the depth of the articles that The 
Florida State University Law Review’s Symposium on Civil Recourse 
Theory has generated. Happily for us, many offer substantial new 
contributions to civil recourse theory. But our friends and commenta-
tors also have not shied away from critique, nor should they have. 
Either way, we have learned a great deal. Either way, we feel the ball 
has been advanced. And either way, we are inclined to respond, if 
only briefly. 
 Part I of this Response offers some remarks on methodology, re-
sponding, with assistance from Gabe Mendlow, to concerns raised by 
Emily Sherwin. Part II addresses an issue raised in different ways by 
Curtis Bridgeman, John Gardner, Andrew Gold, Nathan Oman, and 
Anthony Sebok. The issue is whether civil recourse theory can cap-
ture what is distinctive about tort law while also providing a useful 
framework through which to understand other branches of law, espe-
cially contract law. Part III acknowledges two of the articles that 
deepen civil recourse theory from both a moral and political philo-
sophic point of view: those of Julian and Stephen Darwall and Jason 
Solomon, respectively. Conversely, Part IV focuses on the most point-
edly critical articles: those of Ernest Weinrib, Arthur Ripstein, John 
Gardner, and Scott Hershovitz. All are gracious and welcoming in 
one respect. They invite us to rejoin the fold of corrective justice theo-
rists. They also suggest that civil recourse theory misses essential 
features of tort law that corrective justice theory captures and that 
our critiques of corrective justice theory fall flat. Each has contribut-
ed greatly to our effort to strengthen the theoretical foundation of 
civil recourse theory and to examine with greater care our reasons for 
challenging corrective justice theory.  
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I. CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY AND INTERPRETATION
 Emily Sherwin is right to characterize civil recourse theory as an 
interpretive theory.1 It aims to make sense of the concepts and cate-
gories that lawyers, judges, and legislators deploy when dealing with 
the legal dimensions of certain kinds of interpersonal interactions. 
Broadly speaking, our inquiry has proceeded on the assumption that 
these concepts and categories hang together as a reasonably coherent 
set (although we would be willing to reject this assumption, should it 
become untenable).  
 We can make these points clearer by focusing, as Sherwin does, on 
civil recourse specifically as an interpretive theory of Anglo-American 
tort law. English-speaking lawyers, judges, legislators, and layper-
sons operate with certain conceptions of what it means to commit a 
tort, or to commit a particular tort such as negligence. They likewise 
have conceptions of what it means to sue or be sued in tort, what it 
means for a judge and jury to decide a tort case, what it means for 
the defendant to be ordered to pay damages in light of having com-
mitted a tort, and so forth. In turn, jurists deploy a more refined 
conceptual vocabulary that, among other things, distinguishes tort 
from contract, distinguishes different torts from one another, defines 
elements of and defenses to torts, and recognizes the distinct but 
overlapping roles that legislatures, courts, and juries play in the ar-
ticulation, application, and reform of tort law. As applied to tort, civil 
recourse theory seeks to understand these concepts as interconnected 
pieces of a whole. It aims to explain what courts mean when they use 
the term “tort” in connection with a host of related concepts—for ex-
ample, duty, fault, intent, malice, causation, proximate cause, reli-
ance, injury, comparative fault, liability, damages, injunction, and so 
on—that figure centrally within a practical undertaking that is char-
acterized by adversarial proceedings, initiated and controlled in the 
first instance by a putative injury victim and addressed to the ques-
tion of whether a court should issue a judgment that holds another 
person liable to the putative victim for having injured the victim by 
committing a legal wrong against her.2
 Assessing this contemporary practice in light of its historical ori-
gins, and with the tools of analytic, moral, and political philosophy, 
we have argued that tort law, both in general and in its particulars, 
                                                     
 1.  Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2011). 
 2.  In method, civil recourse theory most obviously stands apart from functionalist or 
instrumentalist theories that treat legal institutions, doctrines, and concepts as tools for 
the achievement of some specified value or goal. For a functionalist, one succeeds in 
explaining a concept such as duty or causation when one succeeds in explaining the things 
that are accomplished when the concept is invoked (such as limiting aggregate liability or 
discouraging claims for which there is unlikely to be reliable evidence as to the claimant’s 
injury). Our approach also stands apart from the sort of formalism embraced by Ernest 
Weinrib. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1-46 (1995).    
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is best made sense of as a law of civil recourse. It is a law of wrongs, 
in that it sets standards of conduct and enjoins people from injuring 
others by failing to meet those standards. It is also a law of recourse, 
in that it empowers victims of these wrongs to demand of the wrong-
doer responsive action as redress for the wrong. To understand tort 
law as a law for redressing wrongs involving injuries is to see why it 
proceeds by private lawsuits rather than by official enforcement ac-
tions, and why it requires a complainant to establish not merely that 
the defendant engaged in risky or otherwise antisocial conduct, but 
that she, the complainant, suffered an injury at the hands of a person 
who wronged her. And it is to see why the outcome of a successful 
complaint is a liability—a vulnerability of the defendant to a legally 
enforceable demand of the complainant requiring the defendant to do 
something for her in light of having wrongfully injured her. 
 Sherwin identifies two problems with our interpretive methodolo-
gy, one more serious than the other.3 The less serious problem con-
cerns the difficulty of determining the degree of “fit” between a theo-
ry that purports to be interpreting a body of law and the body of law 
itself.4 Interpretation is not simple reportage or description; it has an 
inherent element of reconstruction. Whenever one offers a theory of a 
certain area of law, one will confront cases or doctrines that seem to 
contradict the theory, at which point the theorist is left to explain 
them away or to pronounce them anomalous. For example, as Sher-
win again rightly notes,5 we have suggested that (at least on one 
plausible reading of the case) the torts chestnut of Rylands v. Fletch-
er does not, strictly speaking, constitute a tenable application of the 
principles at the core of the body of tort law as a whole, and to that 
extent it is not a true tort case.6 How can a fair-minded observer 
gauge whether our account of tort law as civil recourse is being re-
sponsive to the law it claims to be interpreting rather than imposing 
an artificial order? Sherwin complains that our writings “provide[] no 
assurance that the principle [of civil recourse] is actually embodied in 
[tort] law.”7
                                                     
 3.  See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 238. In addition to the two problems discussed in the 
text, Sherwin skeptically wonders at the end of her paper “why tort law should be 
susceptible to principled explanation,” given that it is “a human artifact, produced by many 
decisionmakers over a long period of time.” Id. at 241. One of us has offered some responses 
to this supposed puzzle. See John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1221, 1241-46 (2008). 
 4.  See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 238-39.     
 5.  Id. In short, we argue that, if Rylands is best read as imposing liability 
notwithstanding that the defendant in that case did everything the law required of him, 
then it cannot be a true tort case, because tort liability presupposes the commission of a 
wrong, that is, the violation of an applicable legal directive. John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 951-52 (2010).   
 6. (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 7.  See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 239. 
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 This criticism is dramatically overstated, unless Sherwin is using 
the word “assurance” idiosyncratically to refer to a notion of unim-
peachable demonstration. Can we demonstrate to all fair-minded 
people that we have found the principle of civil recourse in tort law, 
rather than inserting it? Perhaps not. But if not, we are hardly alone. 
No other view of tort meets this standard, including the deflationary 
view—to which Sherwin seems attracted—that tort law is a “ration-
ally inexplicable heap.”8
 But if the question is really whether we have given assurances
that our interpretation of tort law is sound, we think the answer is 
unequivocally “yes.” Here, some genealogy may be relevant. We came 
to civil recourse theory through tort law. We did not first find the 
principle of civil recourse in Locke or Rawls and then stamp it onto 
tort law. More to the point, we have made it our business to engage 
tort law at multiple levels (some would say ad nauseam) by examin-
ing its history, institutional structure, central doctrines, and leading 
cases, old and new. We have devoted no less effort to explaining why 
the alternative interpretations offered by theorists in other camps 
fall short. All along we have said that the proof for civil recourse the-
ory must be in the pudding. At this point, we would like to think, we 
have put together an impressive confection.9 Whether we have or not, 
we have surely said enough to provide readers with assurances that 
we are not just making up the principle of civil recourse and then 
forcing tort law to conform to it.  
 The more serious difficulty, according to Sherwin, resides in the 
nature of interpretive theories.10 Work like ours, she supposes, aims 
to locate a normative principle immanent in the law.11 As such, it is 
dependent on the state of the positive law: it cannot depart too dra-
matically from extant law without losing its claim to be an interpre-
                                                     
 8.  Id. at 241. After all, there is a lot of evidence—for example, torts treatises, the 
torts Restatements, the points of convergence across multiple jurisdictions’ tort law, the 
common content of Torts courses—to suggest that tort law is vastly more ordered and 
coherent than would be an “inexplicable heap” of judicial decisions.   
 9.  On the particular issue of whether civil recourse theory flounders by treating 
Rylands as a marginal case, it is worth emphasizing two points we have made elsewhere. 
As a matter of doctrine, Rylands is in fact a marginal case. Since it was decided, all 
manner of accident victims have understandably attempted to harness it as a means of 
relieving themselves of the burden of having to prove fault on the part of the defendant. 
Yet courts have steadfastly resisted making Rylands a template, instead confining its 
operation to the narrow category of “abnormally dangerous activities,” which is constituted 
almost exclusively by the operation of reservoirs, the use of explosives, and the keeping of 
wild animals. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 259 (2010). Rylands is also at the margin of tort in 
another sense. It is a case in which the plaintiff fell just short of making out several 
different tort claims (for example, negligence, trespass, and nuisance). Id. at 267-68. As 
such, it is one that closely resembles a tort case, even though, technically, it is not. 
 10.  See Sherwin, supra note 1, at 239.      
 11.  Id. at 240.  
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tation. Yet, there are no guarantees that extant law is sound from 
the perspective of morality. Thus, it is entirely possible that a princi-
ple derived from extant law will not be “a good one.”12 And, Sherwin 
adds, this hypothetical danger is probably realized in the case of civil 
recourse theory. For, on her view, the principle of civil recourse valor-
izes what is in fact a morally suspect system through which plaintiffs 
are unjustifiably permitted to act on vengeful dispositions toward 
persons who have injured them by inflicting harms on defendants by 
depriving them of assets, and the like.13
 The differences between recourse and vengeance are discussed 
elsewhere in this Response and this Symposium.14 But we can begin 
our reply to this aspect of Sherwin’s critique by noting our agreement 
with two points made by Gabe Mendlow.15 We share his view that it 
is facile to treat the imposition of liability on a defendant as a plain-
tiff inflicting “harm” on the defendant.16 A plaintiff who obtains a 
damages payment from a defendant because the defendant has care-
lessly damaged her property is not “taking a whack” at a defendant. 
Tort law is a law of civil recourse precisely because it substitutes a 
regime of legal rights, duties, and powers for a regime of retaliatory 
harming. A plaintiff who recovers damages, like a creditor collecting 
a debt, is obtaining something from the defendant to which the plain-
tiff is legally entitled. We further agree with Mendlow that, even if 
one were to assume that the typical tort plaintiff is motivated to pro-
ceed against a defendant out of a vengeful disposition toward the de-
fendant, that fact would not suffice to establish that tort law is a law 
of vengeance.17 For these reasons and others, we think Sherwin can-
not hold out civil recourse theory as realizing the risk that interpretive 
theory will valorize demonstrably unattractive normative principles. 
 More broadly, we think Sherwin errs in treating the risk of valori-
zation as a defect inherent in interpretive theories. At best, her 
argument holds against a particular variation on interpretive theory, 
and it is a variation to which we do not subscribe. The risk that an 
interpretive theory will end up treating “mere” legal principles as 
first-best expressions of moral principle is present only if one suppos-
es—as Ronald Dworkin famously supposes18—that the extraction of 
principles from legal materials necessarily involves interpreting 
                                                     
 12.  Id.   
 13.  Id. at 240-41; see also id. at 235-36. 
 14.  See Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2011); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil 
Recourse, and Corrective Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299 (2011). 
 15.  See Gabriel Seltzer Mendlow, Is Tort Law a Form of Institutionalized Revenge?, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 129 (2011). 
 16.  Id. at 131. 
 17.  Id. at 134.   
 18.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-32, 240-50, 254-58 (1986).    
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those principles so as to render them the best they can be from the 
perspective of morality. We are not on board with this aspect of 
Dworkin’s thought and accordingly have never suggested that civil 
recourse theory provides the best interpretation of tort law because it 
makes tort law as morally attractive as possible. Quite the opposite, 
we have invoked Holmes’s famous metaphor of “get[ting] the dragon 
out of his cave” to convey that, for us, interpretation is to a signifi-
cant degree independent of ultimate moral judgments.19 To say that 
tort law is a law for the redress of wrongs is to understand it, not en-
dorse it full stop. At most, our approach to interpretation is weakly 
normative. It grants that tort law is reasonably coherent, rather than 
a mess, and that it instantiates and furthers values (such as respon-
sibility and accountability) that are recognizable to us. This is still a 
far cry from an all-things-considered endorsement. For moral rea-
sons, a scheme of civil recourse may sometimes need to give way to 
law or other institutions organized on other principles.  
 It may be that Sherwin—again perhaps with Dworkin in mind—
has run together two different levels at which civil recourse theory 
operates, in the process conflating how the theory plays out with re-
spect to two different activities: law application and law reform. Tort 
law’s being best understood as a law of civil recourse has certain 
implications, in our view, for how judges within a common law sys-
tem are to decide cases. Roughly speaking, their job is to apply the 
law, and this entails that they are obligated to decide tort cases in a 
manner faithful to tort law’s rules and principles. As tort law is best 
understood as a law of civil recourse, judges deciding tort cases must, 
absent special circumstances, accept the principle of civil recourse 
and trace out its implications for their decisions.20 But this is not 
because they must regard the principle of civil recourse as making 
tort law the best it can be. Rather, it is because of their institutional 
role in our legal system as law appliers. By contrast, legislators and 
those who propose law reforms, though they are surely obligated to 
understand the nature of the law they seek to reform, are not so con-
strained. Both a judge and a legislator might, on a given occasion, 
reasonably or even correctly conclude that morality requires tort law 
to give way to some other kind of law, such as a compensation 
scheme. But in the ordinary course, a judge is not empowered to rely 
                                                     
 19.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law From 
the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 
1578 (2006). 
 20.  We do not mean to suggest that courts can or should simply deduce proper 
decisions from the principle of civil recourse. Although tort cases occasionally raise issues 
that implicate the principle directly—for example, the question in Palsgraf of whether a 
plaintiff may sue as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of a duty owed to another—in 
most instances, the principle constrains the ways in which courts should reason about the 
issues before them rather than dictating a unique result.   
2011]  CIVIL RECOURSE REVISITED 347 
on that conclusion as a reason to refuse to apply principles of tort law 
that would otherwise apply, whereas a legislator is entirely free, 
within constitutional limits, to seek to reform the law to conform to 
that conclusion.  
II. THE SCOPE OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY:                                              
TORT, CONTRACT, AND BEYOND
 Several of the Symposium articles discuss whether civil recourse 
theory is a theory of tort law or a theory that can help make sense of 
other departments of private law, including contracts. On this ques-
tion they reach conflicting answers.  
 Curtis Bridgeman offers that civil recourse theory is probably not 
capable of generating an account of contract law.21 Whereas tort can 
fairly be described as law that empowers victims of wrongs to obtain 
recourse against wrongdoers, contracts cannot.22 If, as part of a bar-
gained-for exchange, one promises a certain performance, one is sub-
ject to liability for failing to perform, even if one fails only after tak-
ing extraordinary measures to perform. So recourse for contract 
breaches does not seem to be predicated on conduct that can mean-
ingfully be described as wrongful.23 At the end of the day, Bridgeman 
argues, the mismatch between civil recourse theory and contract law 
stems from the fact that contract law is not law that imposes obliga-
tions. It is instead power-conferring law—law that enables parties to 
change their legal relations.24
 Andrew Gold reaches more or less the opposite conclusion. He 
supposes that civil recourse theory admits of multiple conceptions, 
including a “rights-enforcement” conception that stands apart from 
an accountability-for-wrongs conception.25 The former, he adds, pro-
vides a useful account of contract law. By virtue of a contract, a 
promisee gains an entitlement to demand the promisor’s promised 
performance and, with that, an entitlement to take steps to enforce 
the promise in the event she suffers a loss because it is breached. The 
promisee can insist on enforcement because she enjoys a moral right 
to its enforcement.26 Contract law is a law of recourse in that it ena-
bles a person who holds a certain kind of moral right as against an-
other to enforce that right in the face of the other’s rights violation.27
                                                     
 21.  See Curtis Bridgeman, Civil Recourse or Civil Powers?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 
12-16 (2011). 
 22.  See id. at 12.     
 23.  Id. at 4-5. 
 24.  Id. at 12. 
 25.  See Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 65,
68-73 (2011). 
 26.  Id. at 70-71. 
 27.  Nathan Oman’s Symposium article aims to establish a different point—namely, 
that torts and breaches of contract generate for the breaching defendant a liability to the 
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 From a different angle, John Gardner also suggests that the no-
tion of civil recourse is general enough to cover contract and tort, as 
well as the law of “equitable liability.”28 However, he sees this 
breadth as creating a problem for civil recourse theory. That the the-
ory is broad enough to encompass these other bodies of law demon-
strates, to his mind, that it cannot of itself capture what is distinctive 
about torts. According to Gardner, what makes tort law distinctive is 
not the idea of civil recourse, but rather the idea of repairing losses 
resulting from breaches of noncontractual duties. Tort, he says, is 
that part of the law of civil recourse concerned with corrective justice 
in a primarily reparative mode, as regards losses flowing from 
breaches of noncontractual duties.29 An adequate civil recourse ac-
count of torts, he thus concludes, will have to make use of the concept 
of corrective justice and will have to concede that tort is fundamen-
tally about repairing losses.30
 It will help situate our responses to these lines of inquiry to say a 
word about the orientation of our work and our use of certain termi-
nology. We are first and foremost torts scholars. Tort law is the area 
of substantive law in which we have the greatest claim to expertise, 
and it is primarily through tort law that we have engaged with civil 
recourse theory. We simply have not given contract and other ad-
jacent bodies of law the same sort of attention we have given to 
tort. One manifestation of this lopsidedness in our attention is ter-
minological. We have on occasion used the terms “recourse” and “re-
dress” interchangeably.31 Thanks in part to the Symposium articles, 
we now see that it is important to draw a distinction between these 
two terms.  
 To assert that tort law is a law of civil recourse is to assert that 
tort law arms a person with a legal power against a person (or insti-
tution or entity) to do something in response to a certain kind of 
quandary or difficult situation in which she finds herself. The term 
“recourse” refers to the provision to the complainant of an avenue of 
response, as opposed to leaving her with no lawful way to respond to 
                                                                                                                            
victim’s claim for relief rather than a duty to make reparations. See Nathan B. Oman, Why 
There Is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and Private Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
137 (2011). However, he offers this claim as evidence that contract law, like tort law, is best 
understood not as instantiating a notion of corrective justice, but as a law of civil recourse 
that empowers promisees to obtain recourse against those who breach a legally enforceable 
promise made to them. Id. at 139.  
 28.  John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 47 (2011). 
 29.  Id. at 60. 
 30. Id. at 61.    
 31.  See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1138 (2007) (“Tort law identifies conduct that is wrongful in the 
particular sense of being a mistreatment of one by another, and provides recourse through 
law to the victim against the wrongdoer. It is, in short, a law of wrongs and redress, not a 
law of punishment on the basis of blame or desert.”).   
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the quandary, and leaving her dependent upon the discretion or 
choice of the other person. The flipside of recourse is liability and ac-
countability. To provide recourse to a person is to give her a means of 
holding another liable and in that sense accountable to her. Individ-
uals typically understand these kinds of quandaries as ones in which 
they are entitled to hold the other accountable in some way.   
 Civil recourse so understood is, we think, a broad concept that can 
and does encompass not only torts, but contracts and other domains 
of private law. Persons who want a body of law that will empower 
them against another and who believe they are entitled to such law 
include not only the injured tort victim, but also, for example, the 
disappointed contract promisee, the betrayed trust beneficiary, and 
the dispossessed owner who can locate but not retrieve her chattels. 
Civil recourse theory aims to explain this domain of law. At the same 
time, it distinguishes areas such as criminal law or regulatory law, 
which are not principally concerned with empowering individuals to 
act upon their claims of right against others. 
 Within the relatively broad category of civil recourse law, tort 
stands out as law for the redress of wrongs. Here “redress” means 
something narrower than recourse—it is a particular kind of re-
sponse to the breach of a particular kind of quandary. In a tort case, 
the plaintiff has been injured by another person’s wrongdoing. The 
injury is a kind of interference with interest, including (but not lim-
ited to) certain interferences with interests in one’s bodily integrity, 
one’s ownership and use of property, one’s freedom of movement and 
decisionmaking, one’s privacy, and one’s reputation. To say that tort 
is law for the redress of wrongs is thus to say that it is the branch of 
the law of civil recourse that empowers a person who has suffered an 
injury to obtain a response from one who wrongfully injured her. But 
redress is not the only kind of recourse private law provides, and hav-
ing been wrongfully injured is not the only kind of quandary for 
which our system provides civil recourse; there are other kinds of 
interactions between and among people that generate occasions for 
recourse that stand apart from the wrongs-and-redress category. 
 With the distinction between redress and recourse in mind (re-
dress being a form of recourse), we can outline a response to Gardner. 
He finds it telling that we have not discussed “equitable wrongs.”32
This category encompasses actions for breach of trust, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and breach of confidence, through which claimants typi-
cally seek restitution or disgorgement from an actor who has abused 
a position of trust for personal gain.33 Our inattention to equitable 
wrongs, Gardner argues, demonstrates that, in our zeal to present 
                                                     
 32.  Gardner, supra note 28, at 47.      
 33.  Id. at 46-47. 
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civil recourse theory as an alternative to corrective justice theory, we 
have painted ourselves into a corner.34 To insist that tort law is not
law for the repair of wrongful losses is to deny ourselves access to the 
very thing that separates torts from equitable wrongs. Properly un-
derstood, tort law is that branch of civil recourse law concerned with 
the reparation of wrongful losses, whereas the law of equitable 
wrongs is civil recourse law concerned with the recapture of wrongful 
gains. We have said nothing about equitable wrongs, Gardner sug-
gests, because if we did say anything about them, we would have to 
concede that, as a theory of tort, civil recourse theory cannot stand 
apart from corrective justice theory. 
 In one respect it is difficult for us to respond to this criticism. Ju-
rists in the United States do not routinely use phrases like “equitable 
liability” and “equitable wrongs” to describe a genus or species within 
law.35 We have not been ducking the issue of equitable wrongs: until 
now, we had no reason to suppose that it is an issue to which we need 
to attend. To be sure, courts in the United States recognize actions 
for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidentiality. But it is not 
clear whether these form their own category or instead are aspects of 
other bodies of law, such as the law of agency.  
 Let us assume, however, that equitable wrongs of the sort Gard-
ner has in mind do form a distinct class. Is there a way of capturing 
how this class would stand apart from the class of torts without re-
sorting to the idea that tort is law for the repair of wrongful losses? 
We believe there is. The easiest way to see this is to invoke a stand-
ard American usage. In legal and lay discourse, it is common for tort 
law to be referred to as “personal injury law.” Although a tort need 
not involve an injury “to the person,” and, in that respect, the phrase 
might be misleading, there is a deeper sense in which tort law is
especially about “personal injury.” As we have explained in detail in 
prior work, the injury and the wrong are in an important sense uni-
fied in tort law, for the wrongs are in part constituted by the fact that 
they include the injury.36 A tort victim claims that the defendant ren-
dered her less than intact (even if only temporarily). The plaintiff has 
taken a certain kind of hit from the defendant, a hit to her body, to 
her reputation, to her dominion over her land, to her personal prop-
erty, to her privacy, and so on. It is not surprising that the historical 
                                                     
 34.  Id. at 58-59. 
 35.  Gardner correctly surmises that our silence on this issue has something to do with 
a divide between U.S. law, on the one hand, and U.K. and commonwealth law on the other. 
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 36.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5, at 941-45.  
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core of the subject was the “trespass with force and arms.”37 Tort law 
empowers the plaintiff to obtain redress as against the defendant 
who wrongfully inflicted the “hit,” or injury. Such redress might, and 
frequently does, include repair for the loss concomitant upon the hit, 
but it need not do so.     
 Equitable wrongs are a different kettle of fish. The commission of 
this kind of wrong does not involve a defendant injuring a plaintiff. 
The plaintiff does not take a “hit”; she is not rendered less than 
intact. Rather, the wrong is a betrayal of trust, a trust that was inte-
gral to the legal relationship, and essential to why the trustee pos-
sessed the de facto power that enabled him to betray that trust. 
Accordingly, the form of recourse in question is not an empowerment 
to redress (or seek redress for) a wrongful injury. Rather, (a) the 
plaintiff is empowered to use the court to re-order the relationship 
in accordance with what the relationship of principal and fiduciary 
required; (b) the plaintiff is empowered to “call to the carpet” the fi-
duciary, and discipline the fiduciary qua agent. Tort’s wrongs lead 
the state to empower the plaintiff to demand and obtain from the 
defendant conduct that is responsive to the defendant’s wrongful in-
juring of the plaintiff. Equity’s wrongs lead the state to empower the 
plaintiff to demand and obtain from her fiduciary an accounting as to 
the fiduciary’s handling of the matters with which he has been en-
trusted, and the undoing of transactions undertaken in violation of 
his fiduciary obligations, irrespective of whether those transactions 
injured the plaintiff. 
 So, we can after all distinguish torts from equitable wrongs with-
out conceding that tort law is inherently law for the repair of losses. 
Tort law is a law for the redress of injurious wrongs. This same for-
mulation helps us craft an initial and provisional position on the re-
lationship between civil recourse theory and contract law. As is well 
known, modern contract claims for damages emerged out of “tort” law 
(though it was not then called that) through the action on the case for 
assumpsit.38 Recognized assumpsit claims included those brought for 
losses caused in reliance on certain promises or undertakings that 
went unfulfilled. These were understood as wrongs for which the law 
provided redress. Because they involved injuries resulting from reli-
ance on another’s undertakings, and hence interferences with deci-
sional autonomy, they were treated as torts.  
 Eventually the category of contract claims for damages emerged in 
contrast to the category of tort claims, with the former being under-
stood as predicated upon obligations that obtain through agreement 
                                                     
 37.  GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 9, at 9-11 (discussing the origins of modern 
tort law in the writ of trespass vi et armis).
 38.  See generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT:
THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975). 
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rather than being imposed by law.39 When that happened, some of 
the aforementioned assumpsit cases, because they involved obliga-
tions determined by agreement, became part of contract law. As a 
result, what we today call “contract” claims sometimes recognize as 
grounds for liability certain claims that could just as easily be 
deemed tort claims. That is, contract law, like tort law, sometimes 
operates as a law for the redress of wrongs.  
 But contract law also extends well beyond the “tort” form of re-
course as redress. Indeed, liability in the paradigmatic modern 
breach of contract case—a failure to live up to an exchange-based 
promise irrespective of detrimental reliance—cannot be conceptual-
ized as redress of a wrong involving personal injury. And yet, even 
though these cases take us outside the realm of redress, they do not 
take us outside the realm of civil recourse. As applied to this class of 
cases, contract law is law that empowers persons who have given 
consideration for a promise to demand the performance of the 
promise or to recover its value. Although not about responding to 
wrongfully inflicted personal injury, this part of contract law, no 
less than tort law, is—as Gold and Oman suggest—about empower-
ing people to hold to account those who have breached certain duties 
to them. In contract (but not typically in tort, outside of property 
tort actions for injunction), holding accountable within ex post litiga-
tion does frequently involve requiring defendants to live up to their 
primary duties.40
Contrary to Bridgeman, we see no incompatibility between the 
“strictness” of certain contractual obligations and the idea that con-
tract law is civil recourse law.41 This is for two reasons. First, and 
most obviously, those contract actions seeking specific performance 
rather than damages involve a species of civil recourse quite different 
from redress. The plaintiff-obligee who stands disappointed by a de-
fendant-obligor’s failure to perform is not necessarily in the position 
of someone who has been injured or has taken a hit. If she is seeking 
specific enforcement, it is not because she is in the quandary of being 
an injury victim and wanting to redress the injury; it is (at least typi-
                                                     
 39.  It may be, as Bridgeman maintains, that contract law is in the first instance dis-
tinct from tort law by virtue of contract being power-conferring law, not duty-imposing law. 
Bridgeman, supra note 21, at 8-12. But of course the power that contract law confers is 
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 40.  Gold seems to suggest that a civil recourse conception of contract must rely on a 
notion of redress for wrongful loss, rather than redress for a wrong. See Gold, supra note 
25, at 70. Though we agree that recourse in contract is distinct from redress in tort, we are 
not inclined to locate that distinction in terms of a distinction between recourse for a wrong 
and recourse for a wrongful loss. 
 41.  See Bridgeman, supra note 21, at 5-6.      
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cally) because she still wants the contract to be performed. Civil re-
course empowers the plaintiff to enlist the power of the state to force 
the defendant to perform. Whether nonperformance is plausibly de-
scribed as “wrongful” may not be critical to the plaintiff’s right to 
specific enforcement if the right to specific enforcement is not best 
understood as redress, but only as recourse. 
 Second, however, even if we turn to contract actions for damages, 
and even if (following our earlier discussion) we conceive of such 
actions as invoking a notion of civil redress for wrongs, the so-called 
“strictness” of contract liability presents no obstacle for our view. It 
may be that many actionable breaches of promise do not involve un-
reasonable or faulty conduct by the breaching party—that party may 
well have taken extraordinary measures to perform, yet failed for 
reasons out of her control. It hardly follows that these sorts of 
breaches are incapable of being cogently described as “wrongs.” 
Rather, they might instead be wrongs that are not based on a notion 
of fault.  
 Tort law itself recognizes many kinds of acts that qualify as 
wrongs, notwithstanding reasonable conduct by the defendant.42 This 
is true, for example, of the wrong of trespass to land, as famously 
demonstrated by Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.43 The ship 
captain’s decision to stay moored at the plaintiff’s dock during the 
storm was entirely reasonable. It was also a trespass—an intentional 
physical invasion of another’s land.44 Hence the ship owner was liable. 
Likewise in tort, a manufacturer that, despite using great care, ends 
up selling a dangerously defective product that injures a consumer 
has committed a wrong. The wrong is that of physically harming 
someone through selling a defective product.45 The same goes for 
breaches of contract. If in fact the promisor has made a suitably un-
conditional promise—for example, a promise to deliver, rather than 
to make reasonable efforts to deliver—then the failure to live up to 
the promise is a wrong, even if not a wrong involving fault and even 
if not the sort of wrong that warrants any sort of punitive response.  
 We can make this same point another way. The term “strict liability” 
has one negative connotation, but more than one positive connota-
tion. The negative connotation is that liability does not turn on 
fault—that one can act faultlessly but still be held liable. This 
negative connotation does not yet tell us what the basis of liability 
actually is. Rather, there are at least two possibilities. Liability 
might be wrong-based, even though not fault-based. This is true of 
liability for trespass and products liability. Alternatively, liability 
                                                     
 42.  Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 1143-45. 
 43.  124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
 44.  Id. at 221.     
 45.  GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 9, at 286. 
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could be indifferent to wrongdoing. In this latter situation, there will 
be liability even if, in the eyes of the law, the defendant has in no 
way fallen short of an applicable rule or norm of conduct. Even if one 
may have acted in a manner that is consistent with every conduct-
guiding rule and demand of the law (broadly conceived), one still 
must pay. As noted above, on one interpretation, Rylands v. Fletch-
er—the old bursting reservoir case—imposes this sort of liability.46 It 
is only if liability for breach of contract is strict in the latter sense 
that civil recourse theory loses its grip on contract law. We see no 
reason to think that contract liability is strict in this sense.  
 We conclude this Part with a response to a different set of 
concerns, raised by Anthony Sebok, about the concept of “wrong” as it 
appears in civil recourse theory. Focusing on two facets of 
Blackstone’s thought, Sebok suggests that civil recourse theory is 
wedded to an odd and highly implausible notion of what it means to 
commit a wrong.47 Blackstone treated what we now call tort law as 
law that empowers victims of wrongs to obtain redress for those 
wrongs.48 And yet he also accepted the prevailing view of his time 
that civil litigation was an evil to be avoided, and hence he was 
untroubled by (and perhaps enthusiastically supportive of) 
aggressive use of criminal law to punish those who fomented or 
assisted others’ litigation.49 This combination of positions strikes 
Sebok as puzzling. If tort law exists to empower victims of wrongs to 
pursue their claims, why would the criminal law of the same legal 
system be so keen to prohibit third-party assistance? How can a 
contemporary legal system committed to the principle of civil 
recourse punish a home inspector merely for selling home inspections 
to determine if homeowners might have breach of warranty claims 
against the builder of their homes?50
 To answer these questions, Sebok infers that Blackstone—and 
civil recourse theory more generally—must embrace a very peculiar 
view of what it means for one person to wrong another. On this view, 
one does not wrong another unless the victim of the wrong 
contemporaneously appreciates that she is being wronged.51 This, 
Sebok suggests, is the only thing that can explain why the 
homeowner who only later learns from an inspector that she was sold 
a defective house has not been wronged and, hence, why the likes of 
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Blackstone would be comfortable punishing the home inspector for 
fomenting litigation.52
 As Sebok recognizes, the solution he proffers to his puzzle would 
saddle civil recourse theory with an extremely implausible conception 
of wrongdoing. This “contemporaneous awareness” requirement 
would, for example, exclude from the category of wrongdoing a sur-
reptitious poisoning or an assault on a person who happens to be 
sleeping. We certainly do not hold this view and, so far as we know, 
have never suggested that we do. We doubt very much Blackstone 
did either. The problem resides not with the concept of wrong that is 
deployed by civil recourse theory, but with Sebok’s framing of the 
puzzle. It is erroneous to suppose that there is a deep tension within 
a legal system, such as ours, that is both keen to empower victims to 
obtain recourse for wrongs and keen to discourage the fomenting of 
civil litigation.  
 Sebok’s faux puzzle is grounded in a misunderstanding of what it 
means for law to empower victims of wrongs to obtain recourse. He 
reasons as follows: If tort litigation exists to vindicate victims’ inter-
ests as against those who have wronged them, then more vindication 
can only be a good thing, and hence honest and efficacious efforts 
that promote such vindication—such as the efforts of the home in-
spector—ought to be tolerated if not endorsed.53 In this chain of rea-
soning, there is a subtle but critical shift from a notion of civil re-
course to the sort of “private attorney general” model of litigation to 
which civil recourse theory stands directly opposed.54 The power to 
obtain recourse is an entitlement enjoyed by victims, not a tool for 
the implementation of a social policy. Civil recourse theory thus does 
not suppose that a state of affairs in which there are more frequent 
exercises of the right to civil recourse is better than one in which 
there are fewer. The whole point is to empower those who wish to 
have some way to respond to one who has wronged them, such that, if 
they prevail, they obtain redress. To say that it is their power to ex-
ercise is to deem irrelevant the question of whether, from a societal 
perspective, it would be better to have more people exercising that 
power. A legal system that recognizes rights of civil recourse is not a 
system that is thereby committed to the maximal exercise of such 
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rights, any more than a system that recognizes rights of self-defense 
is committed to the maximal exercise of such rights.   
 To be sure, many interesting questions remain as to what stances 
the law should adopt toward efforts by third parties to enable or 
prompt civil litigation. We have not addressed these questions and, 
hence, have not formed a settled view as to whether, for example, it 
would be sensible and appropriate to prohibit conduct of the sort en-
gaged in by the home inspector whom Sebok describes. Our present 
and more modest point is merely that Sebok misattributes to civil 
recourse theory an implausible conception of wrongdoing, and he 
does so because he falsely posits a tension between the idea that law 
provides civil recourse for wrongs and the idea that law ought to dis-
courage (perhaps strongly) efforts by third parties to encourage oth-
ers to pursue recourse. 
III.   CIVIL RECOURSE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
 Stephen and Julian Darwall, Jason Solomon, and Andrew Gold 
each argues that a civil recourse account of tort law can, at least in 
some instantiations, occupy a conceptual space between corrective 
justice and revenge-based accounts, and as such presents a norma-
tively defensible and perhaps even appealing account of tort law.55
Like us, they have grounded their explanations of the principle of 
civil recourse in a notion of accountability and, more particularly, in 
the principle that one who has been wronged is entitled to hold the 
wrongdoer accountable for having wronged her. Stephen and Julian 
Darwall, drawing from Stephen Darwall’s important book The Se-
cond-Person Standpoint,56 have set civil recourse theory within a 
much broader framework of moral thinking, one which traces back to 
early natural law theorists.57 The very concept of an obligation, on 
their view, contains within it the idea that the putative obligee 
stands ready to hold one to account for performing the obligation and 
to blame one who has breached the obligation.58 The structure of pri-
vate law, with legal claims against tortfeasors, mirrors the analytic 
structure of moral obligation. The right to hold a tortfeasor legally 
accountable through civil law is of a piece with the entitlement, mor-
ally, to blame and resent a person who has wronged one. For reasons 
discussed elsewhere in this Symposium, we disagree with the 
Darwalls about the nature and strength of these connections.59 None-
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theless, we gratefully acknowledge that their contribution to this 
Symposium, as well as Stephen Darwall’s earlier writings, have 
helped us to articulate more clearly the idea of recourse as a holding-
to-account, as opposed to recourse as a wreaking of vengeance.  
 Jason Solomon’s article pushes forward his own distinctive syn-
thesis of Strawsonian and egalitarian ideas in elaborating civil re-
course theory.60 As in his prior work, the results are fresh, provoca-
tive, and illuminating. The current article is especially valuable in its 
implicit assertion that the right of civil recourse can be understood as 
a civil right that is part of a package of powers citizens are afforded 
in an egalitarian state.61 While Weinrib and Ripstein have plainly 
drawn a great deal from Kant,62 and while we have drawn from 
Locke,63 Solomon perceptively reaches out to Rousseau for illumina-
tion of civil recourse theory.64 Our principal misgiving about Solo-
mon’s analysis is one that he himself anticipates. The legal power to 
obtain recourse against wrongdoers is a civil right, and having that 
power is, in a legal system such as ours, an incident of full citizen-
ship. Conversely, for a class of (adult, competent) people to be denied 
this power is for them to be denied the equal protection of the laws. 
Yet the relationship of the law of civil recourse to social equality is 
more oblique than Solomon’s analysis perhaps suggests.  
 To see this, one need only look back to the long periods of our his-
tory in which the law granted the power to obtain recourse on a high-
ly discriminatory basis. Even then, it would have been appropriate, 
in our view, to treat tort law (or what counted as tort law back then) 
as a law of civil recourse. This is because there is nothing inherent in 
the idea of civil recourse that prevents it from being instantiated 
within a legal system that tolerates and indeed practices discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender or race. What separates these earlier in-
stantiations of the principle of civil recourse from modern ones is the 
embrace of a broad egalitarian norm, one manifestation of which is 
the idea that each person is entitled to an avenue of civil recourse. 
 Again, we share Solomon’s view that part of the reason our legal 
system now permits A to have a court enter a judgment against B, 
when B has tortiously injured A, is that the system is committed to 
treating A as B’s equal in several respects, and this is one of them. 
We question, however, the idea that a robust principle of equality is 
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built into the very idea of civil recourse. It is not obvious to us, for 
example, that present-day disparities in access to legal representa-
tion violate the principle of civil recourse, though they might well run 
afoul of egalitarian norms or principles drawn from other parts of our 
law and morality. The evenhanded distribution of the legal powers to 
bring tort claims counts as an important kind of equality only if we 
have an independent account of the importance of having such a 
claim at all. It is, for example, principally because the right to vote is 
part of self-government, the right to speak is rooted in autonomy and 
freedom of conscience, and so on, that the evenhanded inclusion of 
citizens in the domain of rightholders is an important aspect of equal-
ity. By the same token, we need an independent account of the cen-
tral value of a right of civil recourse. To his credit, Solomon, building 
in part on a Darwallian conception of the right to hold a tortfeasor 
accountable, is engaged in precisely that project. 
IV.   CIVIL RECOURSE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
 A central contention developed separately, but in parallel form, by 
Ernest Weinrib, Arthur Ripstein, and John Gardner, is that civil re-
course theory cannot be superior to corrective justice theory, and its 
critique of corrective justice theory cannot be sound, because the only 
plausible version of civil recourse theory depends upon corrective 
justice theory for its justifiability, cogency, and capacity to capture 
the common law of torts. The plainest version of this argument as-
serts that a right of action in tort is only justified by proof that the 
defendant wronged the plaintiff because it establishes that the de-
fendant has a duty to compensate the plaintiff for the injury caused; 
the duty to compensate is said to flow from the underlying primary 
duty. The gist of our response to that argument is contained in 
Zipursky’s article from this Symposium.65 On the negative side, 
Zipursky argues that a duty to compensate does not flow from a 
breach of the primary duty;66 on the positive side, it offers a demand-
based theory of the right of recourse.67
 Beyond this basic point of contention, however, each of the afore-
mentioned corrective justice theorists has offered a battery of more 
specific criticisms. In addition, Scott Hershovitz has offered a general 
critique of the same form as those already mentioned: he, too, argues 
that civil recourse collapses into corrective justice.68 In making this 
argument, however, Hershovitz self-consciously invokes a distinctive 
conception of corrective justice that, ironically, has more in common 
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with the idea of civil recourse than the idea of corrective justice as 
articulated in the work of other corrective justice theorists.69 In this 
final section, we aim to respond briefly both to Hershovitz’s general 
argument and to selected items in the bill of particulars presented by 
Weinrib, Ripstein and Gardner. 
A.   Weinrib 
 Weinrib’s thoughtful and detailed contribution merits an article-
length response.70 We begin this partial response with his efforts to 
rebuff our criticism that corrective justice theory leaves insufficient 
room for the diversity of remedies, starting with injunctive relief in 
particular.71 As to injunctions, Weinrib offers that “corrective justice 
operates not only by requiring the defendant to repair a wrong once it 
has occurred, but also by granting the plaintiff an injunction that 
prevents the defendant from extending the wrong into the future.”72
Because the “remedy is continuous with the right,”73 on his view, the 
right to be free of a nuisance (for example) supports a right to an in-
junction if a nuisance is established. 
 At one level, Weinrib is clearly correct that the version of correc-
tive justice theory he has put forward, which Ripstein has followed, 
accommodates injunctive relief quite comfortably. Two qualifications 
are in order, however. First, nothing in Weinrib’s response provides 
aid or comfort to loss-based versions of corrective justice theory like 
Coleman’s,74 as opposed to the wrongs-based versions offered by 
Weinrib and Ripstein. Second, and more importantly, there is a sig-
nificant theoretical price to be paid by even wrongs-based corrective 
justice theorists for integrating injunctive relief into their accounts of 
tort law. A tremendous selling point of Weinrib’s account has been its 
pedigree, which traces back to Aristotle’s Nicomachaean Ethics and 
its proposition that corrective justice is an arithmetic (as opposed to a 
geometric) concept of justice.75 Weinrib influentially synthesized this 
Aristotelian idea with a Kantian notion of right.76 As to a tort claim 
culminating in an injunction, however, the Aristotelian aspect of the 
picture has now evaporated entirely. The enforcement of the right 
has nothing to do with “making whole” or the undoing of a transac-
tion that results in a normative disequilibrium between injurer and 
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victim. Injunctive relief involves enforcement of a primary right, not 
making whole in light of a prior invasion of primary right. 
 Weinrib’s most vigorous criticisms, however, concern not injunc-
tive relief but punitive damages.77 We have maintained (especially 
Zipursky) that civil recourse theory offers a powerful account of the 
place of punitive damages in tort law, and corrective justice does not 
and cannot do so.78 Weinrib’s response is essentially as follows: (a) 
outside of the United States, the common law does not recognize pu-
nitive damages, only “aggravated damages”;79 (b) corrective justice 
theory can readily account for aggravated damages;80 and (c) civil re-
course theory cannot explain genuine punitive damages any better 
than corrective justice theory, but, given that the focus of civil re-
course theory has to date been on American tort law, civil recourse 
theory has much more to be embarrassed about by punitive damages 
than does corrective justice theory.81
 None of these three criticisms is well taken. First, Weinrib cannot 
succeed in limiting punitive damages to the United States by claim-
ing that other common law jurisdictions recognize only “aggravated 
damages.” For one thing, these are not the only two phrases used in 
non-U.S. jurisdictions: “exemplary damages,” “vindictive damages,” 
and “smart money” are also used, and “exemplary damages” remains 
a quite common usage in the United Kingdom. Even the phrase “pu-
nitive damages” continues to be used in commonwealth countries. 
Broadly speaking, while punitive damages and exemplary damages 
may be a particularly significant phenomenon in the United States, 
they are found across common law jurisdictions. A failure to explain 
punitive damages beyond an explanation of the particular conception 
of aggravated damages Weinrib puts forward is a significant short-
coming of any tort theory that purports to account for the common 
law of torts. 
 Second, it is far from clear that Weinrib really can explain aggra-
vated damages. The key move is to treat this class of damages as a 
special case of compensation—namely, compensation for the “insult” 
atop the injury that attends malicious or wanton wrongs. Yet this 
move only goes so far. We have elsewhere suggested that corrective 
justice theory actually has trouble explaining aspects of standard-
issue compensatory awards. For example, we are not convinced that 
a concept of making whole really sheds a great deal of light on pain 
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and suffering damages or emotional harm damages.82 The concept of 
aggravated damages for dignitary loss—especially when a jurisdic-
tion is not itself willing to treat such damages as an aspect of com-
pensatory damages—is doubly strained when one tries to press it into 
the mold of making whole. While one’s health may be among the 
most important things a person has, it is not at all clear that one 
“has” one’s health in the sense that one might have a house, a car, or 
an intact pair of knees.83 A fortiori, it is far from clear one has one’s 
“dignity” in the relevant sense. Certainly, there is little plausibility in 
the claim that a monetary damages award actually serves to repair a 
rupture in dignity.  
 Finally, Weinrib does not take seriously either the core of the civil 
recourse account of the common law of punitive damages or the use 
to which that account has been put in understanding contemporary 
American law. Part of our reason for treating making whole as a 
principle of remedies (rather than a principle of liability) is to 
emphasize that it operates only as a default in the common law of 
torts, one that can be overcome by proof that the defendant willfully 
or wantonly wronged the plaintiff. In such a case, full and fair com-
pensation does not require a make-whole limitation, which is to say 
that the plaintiff is entitled to engage in something beyond self-
restoration as against such a tortfeasor. In essence, the courts have 
concluded that the victims of malicious or willful wrongs are some-
times entitled to harness the legal system to be punitive or vindictive
against wrongdoers. There is no pretense here that the damages are 
repairing some injury that was done, but they are nevertheless sup-
plied by the court on the grounds that the nature of the defendant’s 
invasion of the plaintiff’s right warrants an extracompensatory 
award for the plaintiff. In different words, the plaintiff is provided 
with the chance to make the defendant “smart” and to hold the 
defendant up as an example to others. The concept of “aggravated 
damages,” at least as put forward by Weinrib, does not begin to cap-
ture this notion.  
 We agree with Weinrib that many jurisdictions, especially in the 
United States, have adopted a different conception of punitive dam-
ages, one that treats the plaintiffs as private attorney generals 
authorized to seek punitive damages in furtherance of the public’s 
interest in deterrence and punishment.84 Like Weinrib, we have 
openly asserted that such a conception lies outside of the basic prin-
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ciples of the common law of torts.85 The civil recourse account, how-
ever, is capable of explaining why an extracompensatory concept of 
punitive damages that truly involves a notion of punitiveness as re-
course does fit within a common law of torts. It is therefore able to 
explain in detail how the genuine recourse-based conception has 
morphed into the “public law” conception, and it is able to offer some 
comments on how and why these conceptions might be disentangled 
in the future. Weinrib’s too-swift embrace of the notion of aggravated 
damages, his minimization of the notion of punitive damages outside 
of American tort law, and his unwillingness to operate at his usual 
level of nuance in this area of law only serve to emphasize the supe-
riority of the civil recourse account on this important topic. 
 Of greatest present concern to us is Weinrib’s misattribution to 
civil recourse theory of the view that a tortiously injured plaintiff has 
no right against the defendant, merely a legal power: 
The second criticism [made by civil recourse theorists against cor-
rective justice theory] is that if the plaintiff has a power and not a 
right (and, correspondingly, the defendant is under a liability and 
not under a duty), then the occurrence of the wrong creates an in-
terval during which the plaintiff has no right, thereby interrupting 
the continuity of the right into the remedy. Whereas corrective jus-
tice conceptualizes the plaintiff’s suit as the attempt to enforce an 
existing right, civil recourse denies that there is any right for the 
plaintiff to enforce. Instead, the plaintiff is merely exercising a 
power to apply to the court to create a new right.  
 In making these criticisms, the theory of civil recourse goes se-
riously off the rails. . . .  
 . . . [T]he fact that the injured party has a power to sue the 
wrongdoer does not imply that the plaintiff lacks a right.86
Notwithstanding his typical generosity and patience in engaging our 
ideas, Weinrib has mischaracterized our position by attributing to us 
the view that a person who was the victim of a tort “lacks a right” 
and has only a power. We have never taken that position. Rather, we 
take the position that: (a) the legal system provides the victim of a 
tort with a legal power to exact damages or another remedy from the 
tortfeasor upon proof that the tortfeasor wronged her—this legal 
power is a right (just as, for example, the power to vote is a right)—
and (b) the plaintiff has a right in a second sense, in that the state, in 
providing the plaintiff with a legal power, recognizes its own duty to 
the plaintiff to provide an avenue of civil recourse. The political (and 
constitutional) right of the plaintiff to the state-facilitated private 
power is correlative to a state duty to provide such a power. The tort 
                                                     
 85.  See, e.g., GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 9, at 355-59.       
 86.  Weinrib, supra note 70, at 284-85.   
2011]  CIVIL RECOURSE REVISITED 363 
defendant does not have a legal duty to pay, however, until that right 
is exercised. Instead, what the defendant has, under the law, is a lia-
bility to pay: for example, the defendant stands in a position such 
that the plaintiff is entitled to demand that the defendant pay, condi-
tional on her proving the tort was committed and her compliance 
with various procedural and jurisdictional requirements.  
 A tort liability is in some ways like a criminal liability. The com-
mission of an armed robbery does not generate a duty to go to jail; it 
creates a liability to be sent to jail, assuming the prosecution can 
make its case. So, too, injuring someone through medical malpractice 
does not generate a duty to pay the injured plaintiff. Instead, it cre-
ates a liability to have a damages judgment entered against one, as-
suming that the plaintiff can make her case. There are, of course, 
many important differences. One is that a bank does not have a legal 
right to have a court send the robber to jail, but a patient does have a 
legal right to have a judgment entered against the physician, assum-
ing the case is proved. Like corrective justice theorists, we believe 
that the plaintiff had a right not to be the victim of tortious wrongdo-
ing, which right was violated, and that she has a right to have a 
judgment entered against the wrongdoer if she proves her case. And 
like Weinrib, we believe that it is the doing of the wrong to the plain-
tiff that generates the right of the plaintiff to have the judgment en-
tered against the wrongdoer. The question that divides the two 
camps concerns the nature of the linkage between the plaintiff’s right 
not to be legally wronged by the defendant and the plaintiff’s right to 
have a judgment entered against the defendant if she proves her 
case. Corrective justice theorists believe that the person who has 
committed a tort at that moment incurs a freestanding legal duty to 
pay damages. The reason the plaintiff has a right to have a judgment 
entered against the tortfeasor is that the legal duty to pay, flowing 
from the prior legal wrong, is sitting there, as it were, awaiting for-
mal legal recognition by the court. There is a sense in which we 
would like to believe this is true, but we simply do not think the posi-
tive law supports it. Nathan Oman’s powerful and incisive contribu-
tion to this Symposium, in our view, cuts directly and very powerfully 
against this account.87
 A fundamental challenge of civil recourse theory is explaining how 
there could be such a right and how such rights could exist in a sys-
tematic manner keyed to whether the tortfeasor wronged the plain-
tiff, given that it is not based on the structure so attractively put for-
ward by the corrective justice theorists. Ripstein’s critique of civil re-
course theory can be understood as asserting that no such explana-
tion is available. He finds the only alternate route to be grounded in 
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an entitlement to avenge wrongdoing and rejects such a foundation 
for several reasons, including its being too morally unattractive to 
serve as a basis for the sort of interpretive account tort theorists are 
seeking.88 Like Weinrib, Ripstein ends up inviting civil recourse theo-
rists back into the fold, rightly pointing out that corrective justice 
theorists can also maintain that plaintiffs have a right in the sense of 
a legal power against tortfeasors and that corrective justice theory is 
capacious enough to accommodate the principle that victims are enti-
tled to an avenue of civil recourse against wrongdoers.89
 We are, of course, grateful to Weinrib and Ripstein for inviting us 
to embrace corrective justice theory. More importantly, we should say 
clearly now (even if we might have erred on this point in the past) 
that we recognize that corrective justice theorists accept the principle 
of civil recourse and are able to accommodate it within their own 
framework. The problem is that even if we rejected our own explana-
tion of why a victim is entitled to have a judgment entered against 
the tortfeasor, we would still not accept the corrective justice account, 
as an interpretive matter, in light of what we have here and else-
where depicted as significant interpretive shortcomings. Although we 
are not persuaded by Weinrib to relinquish our concerns with his 
framework, and we have (in this Response) defended our own, it 
should go without saying that we are enormously grateful for the 
close attention he has given our work, just as we have been greatly 
enriched by his remarkable corpus of scholarship on tort law and pri-
vate law more generally. 
B.   Ripstein 
 Ripstein’s sustained and provocative critique of our work,90 like 
Weinrib’s and Gardner’s, includes far more than we can address here 
with adequate care. Like theirs, it will have to be a topic of future 
writing. Several responses to Ripstein’s critique may be found in 
Zipursky’s contribution to this Symposium.91 It largely accepts Rip-
stein’s advice that civil recourse theory be disengaged from a notion 
of justified retaliation and be rendered less dependent upon  Lockean 
social contract theory. However, on the larger question of whether 
civil recourse theory actually is a form of corrective justice theory, it 
stands its ground. More than that, it offers a sustained response to 
Ripstein’s account of the inseparability of right and remedy in the 
law of torts.92
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 Ripstein’s article presents what could be called a disjunctive chal-
lenge for civil recourse theory.93 It argues that either civil recourse 
theory reduces to a justified-retaliation, or vengeance-based account, 
or it simply turns into a form of corrective justice theory.94 The for-
mer is untenable, but the latter gives up virtually all of what is dis-
tinctive about civil recourse theory. The Zipursky article rejects the 
disjunctive critique, offering a demand-based account of civil recourse 
theory.95 Having been wronged generates in a plaintiff a right to de-
mand responsive conduct of the wrongdoer. The justifiability of the 
demand does not presuppose a preexisting duty of responsive conduct 
on the defendant’s part; civil recourse theory is therefore independ-
ent of corrective justice theory, not derivative of it. The Zipursky ar-
ticle also provides several reasons to conclude that the corrective jus-
tice account put forward by Ripstein cannot fully accommodate the 
variety of wrongs and remedies recognized in tort law and the law of 
remedies as it applies to torts.96
 In this Response, we take up the overarching theme of Ripstein’s 
critique and briefly reply to it. Ripstein lays out four criticisms that 
we have made of corrective justice theorists like himself and Weinrib: 
“that corrective justice cannot account for the diversity of wrongs, 
that it is unable to comprehend the broad spectrum of very different 
remedies, that it fails to explain why a tort suit takes place at plain-
tiff’s initiative and involves not a right to a remedy or duty to repair 
but rather a power on the part of the plaintiff to exact a remedy, and, 
finally, that the corrective justice account is entirely at odds with the 
social nature of tort law and the ways in which it considers standards 
of ordinariness.”97 He argues that all four criticisms reflect a single 
strategy on our part, which he calls “the incorporation strategy”: “a 
strategy of characterizing legal doctrine as the incorporation and 
formalization of social norms that are antecedent to it and contin-
gently taken up by it, based on general assessments of weight or sig-
nificance.”98 He then offers a critique of the incorporation strategy 
and ends by concluding that “[f]reed of the incorporation strategy and 
the resulting bifurcation of rights and remedies, civil recourse is 
what the law of tort would look like if it turned on the axis of correc-
tive justice.”99
 Initially, while one or both of us has indeed asserted each of the 
above-mentioned criticisms of Ripstein,100 and Ripstein is a self-
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declared corrective justice theorist, it is misleading to characterize 
some of these criticisms as criticisms of corrective justice theory as 
such, and it is equally misleading to criticize the affirmative accounts 
we have put forward on that issue as aspects of “civil recourse theo-
ry.” For example, there is good reason to believe that a corrective jus-
tice theorist could accept a conventionalistic account of negligence 
law’s notion of a breach of a duty of care, while a civil recourse theo-
rist could accept a Kantian account of the same concept. Similarly, 
while we have criticized loss-based corrective justice theorists for 
holding an inadequately broad conception of legal wrongs, wrongs-
based corrective justice theorists could accommodate a broader con-
ception of legal wrongs if they were able to offer a better account of 
remedies; it is their need to adopt a cramped account of remedies 
that restricts the breadth of their account of wrongs. 
 Ripstein is right that we have made an effort to put forward a tort 
theory that explains the sense in which the common law of torts and 
a variety of socially and institutionally embedded norms of conduct 
are synergistically related to one another.101 Indeed, we view this 
synergy as among the attributes of tort law that render it socially 
valuable. That does not mean, however, that we reject the aspirations 
of our legal system to root legal obligations and moral obligations in 
notions of right that are defensible from a first-order moral point of 
view. Like figures as diverse as Kant, Holmes, and Cardozo, we rec-
ognize how important it is that judges recognize and give force to the 
positive law, as actually decided, and recognize that such law is likely 
to be rooted in fairly basic and well-accepted norms of conduct. How-
ever, we have always understood Ripstein and Weinrib to accept this 
basic view, too. Conversely, we join them (and Kant and Cardozo) in 
thinking that there is some set of special moral concepts to which le-
gal actors—judges and jurors at least—are aiming to give material 
content as they decide cases. No doubt we, as lawyers (not Kant 
scholars) in the first instance, are more drawn to the material, posi-
tive law side than Ripstein is. And we do not categorically reject the 
possibility that we may have, on occasion, overplayed the here-and-
now (positive law and extant social norms), over normative structure 
and aspiration. With that said, we find it quite unlikely that the dif-
ferences between civil recourse theory and corrective justice theory 
really reflect differences in the extent to which the incorporation of 
conventional social norms or the messiness of positive law play into 
the foundations of our respective views. And if we did, we are rela-
tively confident that civil recourse theory would benefit from the 
comparison, for it is beyond us to imagine that lawyers, judges, and 
law professors cannot really understand the structure of tort law un-
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less they become more philosophically pure and Kantian than Gold-
berg and Zipursky. 
C.   Gardner 
 John Gardner’s elegant critique of our views focuses on three in-
terconnected criticisms: (a) that we do not give sufficient recognition 
to the principle that a successful tort plaintiff is entitled to reparative 
damages as a matter of right, and that it is the only remedy to which 
such a plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right;102 (b) that we do not 
provide any set of criteria that would adequately distinguish tort law 
from other forms of private law in which a right of recourse is predi-
cated upon the defendant having breached a duty to the plaintiff;103
and (c) that we mistakenly depict corrective justice theory and civil 
recourse theory as competitors, rather than recognizing that the 
questions to which each provides answers are not the same.104
 Happily, Gardner proposes a way that we could solve all three 
problems at once. If we recognize that civil recourse answers the 
question of why there is liability at all in torts, we could take correc-
tive justice theory to address the question of what form civil recourse 
takes for torts, and what it is attempting to do. Once we admit that 
tort is about repair, and restoring what the tortfeasor damaged, we 
will see why torts is distinctive.105 We need to change as to (a) in or-
der to get the positive law correct; we need to change as to (b) in or-
der to answer an important taxonomic question about tort law within 
private law. We need to change so that we can join forces with our 
friends Coleman, Gardner, Perry, Ripstein, and Weinrib—the correc-
tive justice theorists. 
 In a highly qualified form, we are willing to take up some aspects 
of Gardner’s suggestion (and, indeed, have arguably done so already) 
that corrective justice theory, and its utilization of the right to be 
made whole, are important principles at the level of explaining 
what remedies are available in the common law of torts, and why. 
Nevertheless, several important qualifications are in order. First, 
as we suggested in Part II, tort law is a law of redress for wrongs, 
and the wrongs of tort law have a particular character. All of 
them involve not only an interference with an interest and not only a 
mistreatment but—in an important sense—a trespass, violation, or 
injury infliction. A tort is not simply a breach of a duty, but a breach 
of a duty of noninjury. Gardner is close to this point in suggesting 
that a duty of repair is critical, because there is a sense in which a 
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tort is a twisting or breaking or intrusion or attack. However, once 
we understand that the duties breached and the rights in question 
are of a distinctive kind—rights against wrongful injuring—there is 
no need to distinguish the field more indirectly in terms of kinds of 
remedy available. 
 Second, while Gardner is right to recognize that we have accepted 
that there is a default remedy of compensatory damages (and right 
that we have been somewhat cagey or equivocal on this point),106 we 
have never accepted that there is a default remedy of reparative 
damages. The notion of reparation, while important, is far too narrow 
to cover the wide range of torts for which compensatory damages are 
available. Libel, invasion of privacy, battery, assault, and even many 
medical malpractice claims empower individuals to demand compen-
sation, even where there is simply no live option of repairing the 
damage that was done. Compensation is a broader notion that is still 
distinctive from the sort of punitive or retributive damages that is 
not available as a matter of right. A wrongdoer can be legally re-
quired to compensate her victim just as a parent might be morally 
required to compensate (or reward) one who rescues her child. Money 
is provided in recognition of what one person did to another and the 
change in welfare that doing so involved; it is not necessarily provid-
ed to restore the status quo in any sense or to render intact that 
which was damaged.  
 Third, while Gardner is perhaps correct in saying that we have 
been too equivocal about the importance of reparative (now recon-
strued as compensatory) damages,107 and while his contrast between 
punitive and reparative remedies is instructive,108 he is probably too 
confident in his assertion that reparative damages are available as 
a matter of right in tort (and that injunctive remedies, for exam-
ple, are discretionary).109 This is probably quite exaggerated on both 
sides. In American nuisance law, it is still true that an injunctive 
remedy is subject to equitable defenses and that these defenses may 
involve the exercise of discretion by a trial judge. But this point is 
not aptly put by saying that the injunctive relief is discretionary; it 
is conceived of as a right, even if defeasible by equitable considera-
tion. As hinted in Gardner’s quotation of Andrew Burrows,110 equally 
serious affirmative defenses are available in claims for reparative 
damages, and these can either defeat a tort claim for reparative 
damages entirely (even if the tort itself is proven) or—as in the case 
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of comparative fault—constitute a ground for a damages award that 
is far from reparative. 
 Finally, and most importantly, even while we do recognize the im-
portance of compensatory damages having pride of place, we insist 
(a) that this is a principle of remedies, not a principle concerning 
whether there shall be some redress for the plaintiff and (b) that the 
make-whole measure should be understood as an effort to flesh out 
the more basic idea that an injured plaintiff in a tort case is entitled 
to “fair and reasonable” compensation, and this in turn should be un-
derstood as an interpretation of what a tort plaintiff is entitled to ex-
act (in the normal case), not as an account of what the defendant is 
duty-bound to provide or what justice requires be done.  
D.   Hershovitz 
 The first claim of Scott Hershovitz’s contribution is simple and 
powerfully defended, and it corresponds to the core of the argument 
against Weinrib’s continuity thesis and Ripstein’s linkage between 
right and remedy.111 Hershovitz asserts that the Aristotelian concep-
tion of corrective justice is untenable as to the wrongs of tort, because 
things cannot really be put back to the way they were: 
The Aristotelian tradition of thinking about corrective justice re-
flects a deep desire to overcome what (to tweak a phrase from 
Rawls) we might call the circumstances of corrective justice. We 
cannot undo what we have done. No matter how hard we wish that 
we could turn back time when a trigger is pulled or a driver hits a 
child, we cannot. The moment one person wrongs another, the 
wrong is part of our history, indelibly, and we must decide how to 
go on.112
Hershovitz’s defense of this claim is more eloquent than our own ef-
forts to make just this point; we thank him for his help. 
 Surprisingly, however, Hershovitz does not reject corrective jus-
tice theory but argues instead that it is only Aristotelian and rectifi-
cation-based corrective justice theories that are untenable.113 He 
sketches, alternatively, what might be called a “getting-even” corrective 
justice theory of tort law.114 Even if civil recourse theory might suc-
ceed as a critique of rectification-based corrective justice theory, he 
argues, it fails as a critique of getting-even corrective justice theory.115
Indeed, suggests Hershovitz, civil recourse theory is best understood 
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as a version of getting-even corrective justice theory.116 In providing 
victims of torts with an avenue of civil recourse against tortfeasors, 
tort law is allowing these victims to get even with tortfeasors. In that 
sense, tort law allows corrective justice to be done. 
 Even as we, in this Symposium, have devoted a good deal of effort 
to separate our views from revenge-based conceptions of tort, we con-
cede that the elegance and potential power of Hershovitz’s account 
give it some appeal. In the end, however, we would need to know a 
great deal more about his account to move in that direction, and what 
we currently know leads us to think it unlikely that we would do so. 
The principle reason is this: although we are willing to entertain 
Weinrib’s use of the notion of “normative equilibrium” to enable the 
concept of corrective justice to expand beyond a naïve materialist no-
tion of restoration, we are inclined to think Hershovitz’s account 
moves too far from Aristotle to count as a version of corrective justice. 
The notion of “corrective justice” is at least partially teleological. The 
assertion that corrective justice is done carries with it an implication 
that the state of affairs in which the defendant pays the verdict is in 
an important sense an improvement on the state of affairs in which 
there is no tort claim brought or the verdict is never paid. By embrac-
ing civil recourse theory and rejecting corrective justice theory, we 
aim to convey the thought that, while our legal system takes the view 
that a plaintiff who is genuinely the victim of a tort is entitled to 
bring a tort claim and entitled to exact a remedy from the tortfeasor, 
it does not necessarily take the view that it is a prima facie improve-
ment in any sense if the plaintiff does bring such a claim or a com-
pensatory damages verdict is in fact paid. The state is duty bound to 
empower such a victim to bring a claim and to enforce if she does so, 
but this does not entail that justice is done if she brings the claim 
and that it is not done if she does not bring it.  
 Additionally, even Hershovitz’s own account leads us to question 
whether tort law is really about getting even. Tort law (including the 
law of remedies that applies to tort cases) identifies what a successful 
claimant stands to obtain, and the liability a tortfeasor will face, if 
the parties cannot negotiate to what they think would render them 
“even.” And, of course, the state prohibits unilateral vindictive action 
by the victim against the wrongdoer—regardless of whether the de-
fendant has paid, refused to pay, negotiated, or refused to negotiate. 
All of this leads us back to an earlier statement one of us made: “tort 
law is about . . . not getting even, [but] about what the state gives us 
in place of getting even.”117
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V. CONCLUSION
 The idea of civil recourse goes back hundreds of years, at least, 
and is robustly articulated in the writing of Blackstone and Locke. In 
reintroducing it into Anglo-American tort theory, we hoped it would 
help us find a better way to understand the field of torts, and we 
aimed to generate a recognition of the normative standing of the tort 
plaintiff asserting her right of action, not simply the tort defendant 
facing up to liability. It is our good fortune that the idea of civil re-
course has generated considerably more interest than this. Corrective 
justice theorists are eager to admit that the principle of civil recourse 
is fundamental to tort law, even if it does not displace corrective jus-
tice. Contract theorists and private law theorists generally claim that 
it is not simply torts but a wide range of private law that stands to be 
illuminated by reference to the principle of civil recourse. Moral and 
political philosophers have seen in civil recourse an expression of the 
fundamental notion that those who are wronged have a special 
standing to demand accountability from the wrongdoer.   
 As for ourselves, our primary interest remains the illumination of 
the field of torts, the rights of the tort plaintiff, the liabilities of the 
tort defendant, and the linkage between a civil wrong and the right of 
action that governments provide by way of offering civil recourse to 
injured persons—areas in which we have been met with substantial 
resistance from our most esteemed friends and colleagues. The ease 
with which civil recourse has been accepted as a basic idea within the 
domain of law and morality provides comfort and consolation for our 
“wounds” on the battlefield of torts scholarship. More seriously, the 
continual testing of civil recourse theory has proved indispensable in 
permitting us to make meaningful progress in our thinking.   
